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Anthony T. Charles* The Atlantic Canadian
Groundfishery: Roots of
a Collapse
While many explanations have been proposed for the 1990s Atlantic Canadian
groundfishery collapse-ranging from "natural causes" to over-fishing and dam-
aging technologies, to failures of fishery management and science-this paper
examines the possibility that underlying these, at the roots of the collapse, lie a
set of entrenched attitudes that have driven fishery decision making. These
attitudes, about the natural world, about management and about how the fishery
should function, became influential especially where they prevailed at the
institutional level, as the accepted wisdom among the dominant players in
government and the fishery. Four sets of conservation-related attitudes are
considered, dealing with (1) the extent to which management responsibilities are
accepted and shared by fishery regulators and fishers, (2) the "burden of proof"
and where it should lie in judging conservation concerns, (3) a view that
"conservation can wait", to avoid disrupting catches and fishing activity, and (4)
a belief that "the system works", that fundamental change in fishery management
is unnecessary. It is noted that a failure to modify attitudes in the fishery may well
lead to a situation in which history once again repeats itself.
Introduction
Why did the Atlantic Canadian groundfishery collapse in the early
1990s? The evidence to date suggests that a major part of the blame must
be placed on over-fishing. And in attempting to understand why this
occurred, a common thread seems to lie at the core: the prevailing
attitudes in the fishery-attitudes about nature, about management, and
about how the fishery should function. This paper pursues the idea that
such attitudes may have been driving forces in the fishery collapse-and
may lead us to repeat history, if we fail to examine them critically now.
Emphasis here is placed not so much on "personal" attitudes, but more on
those which became prevalent at the institutional level, as the accepted
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wisdom amongst the dominant players in government and the fishery; it
is these which most affected the process of fishery decision making.
Four sets of conservation-related attitudes are considered here, con-
cerning: (1) the appropriate "role of the regulator", and the relation of
fishers to the government, (2) the "burden of proof' and where it should
lie in judging conservation concerns, (3) the idea that "conservation can
wait", to avoid disrupting catches and fishing activity, and (4) the belief
that, "the system works", that fundamental change in fishery manage-
ment is unnecessary. These themes are addressed consecutively in the
next four sections. The final section then synthesizes these views and
presents some conclusions on changing attitudes toward an emphasis on
sustainability in fishery systems.
I. The Role of the Regulator
Must fishing fleets be regulated in their harvesting efforts? To what
extent? How can regulation best be achieved? Canadian fishery manage-
ment has struggled with these questions, and is still in search of the
answer.
1. The Spirit of Free Enterprise
Historically, the world's oceans were viewed as limitless frontiers,
containing abundant resources for all. Fishing tended to attract those with
a desire for the adventure of the hunt, an entrepreneurial "free enterprise"
view of the world, and a dislike of regulations that interfere with the
"business of fishing". On the other hand, in modem times, abundant
evidence from fisheries worldwide demonstrates that unregulated laissez-
faire exploitation is incompatible with long-term sustainability. Indeed,
in the absence of management, even extinction can result from an
uncontrolled yet economically "rational" pursuit of profit maximization.I
Thus, the fishery presents an odd combination: a general acceptance of
the need for regulations that limit harvesting activity, and at the same
time, a widespread distaste for such controls. Conservation benefits
accruing from regulation remain in constant conflict with the freedom
sought by fishers to travel the world's oceans in search of fish and profit.
(Interestingly, the "free enterprise spirit" did not prevent many in the
fishery from accepting government subsidies for vessel construction and
purchase of gear. In Atlantic Canada, these ranged from the Fisheries
1. C.W. Clark, Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Re-
sources 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1990).
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Loan Board's boat-building subsidies, to the well over $100 million
given to the two major offshore companies, Fishery Products Interna-
tional and National Sea Products, in their early-1980s restructuring.2
A clear illustration of this conflict between fishery regulation and the
"freedom to fish" arose in the 1995 "turbot war" between Canada and
Spain, a dispute which centred around the common view of the high seas
as a bastion of free enterprise entrepreneurship. The episode began when
the European Union (notably Spain), unhappy with the catch allocation
of Northwest Atlantic turbot (Greenland Halibut) it had received from the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), unilaterally de-
clared its own higher catch target. Several E.U. vessels set out in search
of this catch, fishing just outside Canada's 200-mile limit. Canada viewed
this as a threat to conservation, and arrested a Spanish vessel for violating
the coastal state's regulations. The European Union responded by calling
this actilon "pilacy", oxguing that it contravened theis ftcedom to fish the
high seas.
After much diplomatic tension, the matter was eventually resolved
with a compromise on catch allocations and agreement on management
of future harvests. The event drew broad attention to the over-riding need
for fishery conservation and regulation, but it is unlikely that entrenched
attitudes of free enterprise will soon disappear from the world's fisheries.
2. Total Control
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the spirit of free enterprise lay
a common attitude of government that, in seeking to conserve and
regulate the fishery, it must exercise firm and wide-ranging control over
fishers, fishing fleets and processors. In Canada, an extensive regulatory
framework was established in an effort to achieve such control, with
harvests allocated amongst users (to balance conflicting social, eco-
nomic, and cultural goals) and over time (to balance present and future
needs). This framework typically operated in a "top-down" manner,
providing massive power to one individual, the Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans, some power to those in the fishery bureaucracy, minimal
decision-making power for fishers, and none for Canadians outside the
fishery (a point discussed in detail below).
Attempts at total control of the fishery reflect two questionable
assumptions about human behaviour: (a) that, in the spirit of Hardin's so-
2. L.S. Parsons, "Managenent of Marine Fisheries in Canada" (1993) 225 Canadian Bulletin
of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 763 (Ottawa: National Research Council of Canada).
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called "Tragedy of the Commons"3, fishers are selfish profit-maximizers,
driven to take as much financial benefit from the resource as possible,
without regard for conservation, and (b) that fisheries are "controllable"
by management agencies, which can force those fisheries to behave in a
socially-optimal fashion.
While these assumptions have been seriously challenged in recent
years4 , they have had a major impact on fishery thinking. Together, they
produced an "us versus them" attitude within fishery management.
Assuming that fishers had no interest in conserving fish for the future,
regulatory agencies typically took sole responsibility for conservation,
and sought to achieve this through controls on the fishers. Thus, Hardin's
view of the world became self-fulfilling: with fishers left outside the
management decision-making system, they indeed had no other role than
that of catching as much fish as possible. Rather than creating social or
peer pressure to follow the regulations, pressure increased to "beat the
system", with those who did so likely to be emulated by others. Under
such circumstances, no level of enforcement, however extensive, has
been able to prevent illegal fishing, and the potential for building a natural
partnership in support of conservation disappears.
Attempts at "total control" over fishers in Atlantic Canada were
modified in the 1980s with the development of an extensive consultative
system by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). Fishery
management is further evolving today, as regulatory bodies come to
realize that efforts at total control have typically failed to achieve
conservation. Indeed, support from fishers may well be a pre-condition
for sustainability in any overall management framework.
3. No Place for the Public
The above discussion suggests that effective fishery management must
satisfy the dual requirements of regulating the fishing industry and
involving the fishing industry. The focus of these requirements on the
government's connection with the industry helps to explain why DFO
staff deal almost exclusively with those who exploit the fish resource.
Indeed, a common theme in DFO is that of "serving" its clients in the
fishing industry.
However, the government's principal fishery mandate lies not in
serving the resource users, but rather in conservation and wise use of the
3. G. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243.
4. For a critique of Hardin, see F. Berkes et al. "The Benefits of the Commons" (1989) 340
Nature 91.
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fish, a natural asset owned by the Canadian public. While owners of
valuable property usually have some say in its management, the attitude
of government appears contrary to this. The Canadian public-those who
should be viewed as DFO's major "clients"-have been given no role in
fishery management, which has been typically restricted to government
and industry.
Since a principal role of DFO lies in regulating the use of a public asset,
one can make useful comparisons with other government regulatory
agencies. For example, both DFO and the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) are mandated to protect the
public interest by controlling the use of a (renewable) public resource:
fish and "airwaves" respectively. To do so, both must regulate the actions
of an industry: the fishery and the electronic mass media. Both issue
licenses to users, and have the power to withdraw those licenses from
anyone violating license conditions. Yet there are major differences in
attitude. While the CRTC, charged with "serving the public interest",
invites public input on the regulation of an industry, DFO seeks to "serve"
clients within the industry, while allowing little public involvement.
Given its primary mandate to conserve public assets, this suggests a
clear need for government to adjust the relative importance accorded
resource owners and resource users in fishery management. A greater
role for the resource owners is needed, while recognizing that, for
pragmatic reasons, effective fishery management must be designed and
implemented with the involvement of those being regulated, the fishing
industry.
4. No Place for the Community
As noted above, management efforts in a sustainable fishery must serve
the public interest by regulating resource harvesting, but must do so in
such a way as to encourage fishers and coastal communities to "buy in"
to the process. The key to this may lie in "co-management", the creation
of suitable institutions in which fishers and communities work with the
government to jointly develop and enforce regulations.' This implies a
broader participation in decision making and a more collective responsi-
bility for fishery sustainability.
The preferred approach in this direction is community-based co-
management, involving joint decision making by governments, fishers,
5. See e.g. F. Berkes, ed., Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based
Sustainable Development (London: Bellhaven Press, 1989); E.W. Pinkerton, ed., Co-
operative Management ofLocalFisheries (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
1989).
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and relevant institutions in coastal communities. This approach promotes
efficient management, since the involvement of community institutions
(in addition to government and industry interests) maximizes the moral
suasion acting in support of conservation. Such an approach already
exists informally in parts of the Atlantic lobster fishery.6 It is also
prevalent in agreements between the government and Native peoples
across Canada-based on formal sharing of decision making with geo-
graphically-based organizations. For example, the "Fisheries Joint Man-
agement Committee", comprised equally of Inuit and government mem-
bers, co-manages fish and marine mammals in part of the Canadian
Arctic.7
With the proven success of community-based co-management else-
where in Canadian fisheries, one might imagine that this could provide a
useful model for the Atlantic groundfishery. Yet it is an approach which
has been essentially ignored in the mid-1990s rush of government to
promote co-management (as it "downloads" its responsibilities, and
costs, onto resource users).
Instead, DFO has preferred to extend its current approach of "sector-
based" management, in which it focuses on segments of the industry,
perhaps defined on the basis of vessel size (e.g., offshore vessels over 100
feet in length) and/or gear type (e.g., draggers under 65 feet in length),
which compete against one another for a share of the fishery "pie".
However, a sector-based model of co-management seems less than ideal
in that: (1) it institutionalizes divisions amongst fishers, viewing them not
as residents of coastal communities but rather as members of disjoint
special interest groups, and (2) it ignores the potential of coastal commu-
nities themselves to improve the efficiency of fishery management by
increasing the level of moral suasion.
If the federal government indeed sees coastal communities as irrel-
evant to fishery management, this attitude might reflect a view of the
groundfishery as no more than a mass of individuals chasing fish around
a large expanse of ocean. In such a world, there may seem to be little scope
to incorporate coastal communities, counties, regions or other geographi-
cal entities within fishery management. On the other hand, the promotion
of sector-based over community-based co-management may be due
simply to the government's greater familiarity with the former, or to a
disinclination to tackle new challenges with the latter, such as those
6. See e.g. J. Brownstein & J. Tremblay, "Traditional Property Rights and Cooperative
Management in the Canadian Lobster Fishery" (1994) 7:5 The Lobster Newsletter.
7. "Cooperative Management: New Partnerships for Fisheries Management" (November/
December 1990) Pisces 8.
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involved in devising suitable geographical "community" boundaries in
the groundfishery. Whatever the reason, it would seem that the commu-
nity-based approach, with its potentially greater stability and efficiency,
is deserving of greater attention from government.
II. The Burden of Proof
Uncertainty is pervasive in the fishery. Stock sizes are never known
precisely within a given year, much less from one year to the next.
Impacts of fishing methods on the resource or on the environment cannot
be predicted exactly. Given this uncertainty, decisions must be made by
balancing risks. Typically, these involve both a risk of stock and ecologi-
cal collapse (due to excessive exploitation or environmental damage) and
a risk of foregoing economic benefits (if harvests are lower than neces-
sary). The fundamental question is: in considering these risks, should the
"burden of proof" favour exploitation or conservation?
1. The Scientific Method
Assessments of groundfish stocks over the past decade have often
produced misleading results. This may have been due as much to the
assumptions built into the scientific analysis as to the vagaries of fish
behaviour. Some such assumptions worked against conservation, and
were difficult to change once established. A "burden of proof' was placed
on demonstrating the need for such changes before the DFO scientific
structure would act. Three examples are given here of cases where this
"burden of proof" in the scientific process led to the setting of TAC quotas
at levels which (in retrospect) were excessive.
First, consider the process by which a fish population reproduces.
Clearly, if there are no spawning fish, there will be no resulting young fish
("recruitment"); hence, up to a point at least, there must be some positive
connection between the number of spawners and the resulting recruit-
ment. However, while this is logical in theory, in practice natural
fluctuations in the ocean environment and in the corresponding data
available to scientists make it difficult to "prove" the connection. In the
absence of such proof, links between fish generations were not incorpo-
rated into the groundfish assessment process.' Furthermore, although
logically there must be a certain number of spawners-a critical "spawning
8. J.A. Hutchings & R.A. Myers, "What Can Be Learned From the Collapse of a Renewable
Resource? Atlantic Cod, Gadus Morhua, of Newfoundland and Labrador" (1994) 51 Can. J.
of Fish and Aquat. Sci. 2126.
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stock biomass"-required to maintain the reproductive process, no
operational approach was put in place to ensure this.
Second, consider the stock estimation process. In the mid-1980s,
scientists began to realize that, year after year, they had been regularly
over-estimating the size of many fish stocks. While the cause of this
systematic error (known as a "retrospective pattern") is still unclear, the
conservation implications were great. Over-estimates of biomasses in
turn led to over-estimates of the number of fish that could safely be
caught. Hence, supposedly-safe quotas were often too high. Although
this problem was identified, its impact could not be "proven" conclu-
sively. As a result, quotas were not adjusted accordingly.
Third, dumping of undesired fish and mis-reporting of actual fish
landings have been prevalent practices for years. Hence, more fish have
been killed by the fishing fleets than have been reported, a serious
problem from a conservation perspective not only in its direct effect on
the stocks, but also because it implies poor quality in the data the scientists
use to advise on subsequent quota levels. While such practices were well-
known for years, the extent of dumping could not be "proven", and hence
no systematic adjustments were made to the stock assessments.
In each of these cases, an alternative response would be to err on the
side of conservation, creating incentives to minimize nonconservationist
activity. For example, one could assume a high level of dumping (thereby
reducing allowable catches accordingly), unless the level of dumping
were proven to be lower.
2. The Technology Debate
A controversial issue in the groundfishery concerns the choice amongst
harvesting technologies. Of the various methods-trawls (draggers),
longlines, handlines, gillnets, fish traps, and so on-which is the best
means to catch fish from a long-term conservation perspective, and which
from a short-term catch-maximizing perspective? While each technology
can pose conservation problems if used improperly, do any have inherent
negative features that should lead us to favour one technology over
another?
This issue often focuses on the technology most commonly referred to
as a threat to conservation, otter trawling (or "dragging"), in which nets
are pulled over the ocean bottom.9 This gear is recognized as a powerful
9. Many fishers believe that dragger technology contributed substantially to the fishery
collapse. See e.g. SW Nova Fixed Gear Association, "The Canadian Maritimes Fishery: Let's
Fix It" (Shelbourne, Nova Scotia, 1995).
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means of catching fish, but also as the source of conservation concerns,
particularly due to (a) its impact on the ocean bottom habitat, and (b) its
relative unmanageability, given a capability to inflict large-scale impacts
on fish stocks within a short period of time. While these are both inherent
features of the technology, their effect is hotly debated. With respect to
dragging on the ocean bottom, uncertainties in ocean ecology make it
difficult to "prove" negative impacts on the food chain and on ocean
productivity. In terms of manageability, while the very power of trawling
technology implies a potential for intensive and large-scale over-harvest-
ing, it is difficult to prove that such damage is inescapable-some argue
that it could be avoided if fishers universally adopted a "conservation
ethic".
Where should the burden of proof lie in determining whether one
fishing technology is inherently more harmful to conservation than
another? A "court of taw" perspectwe ,ould assume that no technology
is unduly harmful, unless proven more detrimental "beyond a reasonable
doubt". This view tends to dominate in the fishery. On the other hand, if
the burden of proof is reversed so that decision makers err on the side of
conservation °, the balance of evidence might suggest a shift away from
use of the most potentially-damaging technologies. The choice of where
one places the burden of proof may well lie at the heart of attitudes
connecting fishing technologies and conservation.
1II. Conservation Can Wait
Consevation compromises have occurred frequently .n Atlantic Cana-
dian groundfish management. The desire to maintain catch levels, at the
expense of conservation, can be examined at a personal level-where
preferences are shaped by the "free enterprise spirit" discussed earlier,
combined with a lack of a conservation ethic and a strong focus of each
fisher on his/her own income levels. But at the level of the fishery system,
the process is more complex. Scientists, managers, politicians and
industry all participated in an effort to avoid disrupting the harvesting
process, at the cost of failing to meet government's declared conservation
goals. For example, of all the TAC quotas set over the 1977-1989 period
in the Scotia-Fundy management region-from the Bay of Fundy to the
northern tip of Nova Scotia-it has been shown that two-thirds of these
10. For a treatment of the "precautionary approach" in fisheries management, see. S.M.
Garcia, "The Precautionary Principle: Its Implications in Capture Fisheries Management"
(1994) 22 Ocean and Coastal Management 99.
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exceeded the "F0 ." level which formed the basis of the government's
own management policy.1
1. Avoiding Disruption
A belief amongst most scientists that groundfish were "resilient" enough
to withstand exploitation above target levels, combined with a desire
amongst managers and politicians to avoid disrupting the fishery, pro-
duced a management process containing certain "stabilizing" features
that limited the effectiveness of conservation measures. For example, the
so-called "50% rule" was a cornerstone of Atlantic Canadian groundfish
management through 1992, one which aimed to smooth out the socioeco-
nomic impacts of downturns in stock abundance.12 Under this rule, when
scientific evidence pointed to the need for large cuts in the quotas,
management would reduce the allowable catches slowly, by 50% of the
difference each year, rather than taking immediate action to cut quotas to
desired levels. For example, if the scientific advice called for a reduction
of 10,000 tonnes in what could be caught from one year to the next, the
actual reduction would be only 50% of this, namely 5000 tonnes.
However, this gradualism did not apply in the opposite direction: if
scientific analysis suggested an increase in the allowable harvest, the full
increase could be made immediately.
A second, more implicit vehicle to prevent stock declines from
disrupting harvesting lies in the attitude toward bycatch, the uninten-
tional harvest of untargetted stocks. While many measures have been
introduced over the years to reduce bycatches, it is often simply not
possible to harvest one stock without some catch of another. In such
cases, if fishing on a relatively healthy stock produces bycatch of a
depleted or even endangered stock, the only way to avoid the latter is to
close the fishery altogether. Should this occur? The dominant attitude in
the fishery holds that it should not. Although bycatches should be
minimized, the fishers should not be prevented from catching any stock
that can withstand harvesting. This view was clearly expressed in the
course of the early-1990s groundfish collapse. For example, in 1993,
when the government closed a number of fisheries directing on threat-
ened stocks, harvesting of those stocks continued, in the form of
bycatch-so as to avoid disrupting other fisheries.
11. R.G. Halliday, F.G. Peacock & D.L. Burke, "Development of Management Measures for
the Groundfishery in Atlantic Canada: A Case Study of the Nova Scotia Inshore Fleet" (1992)
16 Marine Policy 411.
12. See for example, Canada, 1992 Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan (Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services, 1991) at 5.
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Even in cases where avoidance of disruption was not built into the
groundfish management process, it could be achieved at a later stage in
the process. For example, while DFO scientists recommended a total
TAC quota of 125,000 tonnes for northern cod in 1990, the Minister's
decision for that year was to set the TAC at 197,000 tonnes "following
extensive consultations with the industry, the Atlantic Council of Fisher-
ies Ministers and the Special Cabinet Committee on Northern Cod."' 3
While this TAC was in keeping with the recommendation of the blue-
ribbon Northern Cod Review Panel 4 , the decision was certainly contro-
versial-many Newfoundland inshore fishers felt this TAC was so high
as to endanger the stock, and sought an injunction to overturn it.' 5
2. The Annual Business Plan
Fishing is an unusual economic activity, in that no one can be certain how
much of the key ingredient is available in any given year, or what effect
this year's production will have on the future availability of fish. In other
words, there is a high level of uncertainty in fisheries, and a correspond-
ing need for an "adaptive" approach to fishery management, one which
adjusts exploitation levels to match whatever Nature provides.
Such an adaptive management philosophy is well-established in the
salmon fisheries of Canada's Pacific coast, where high levels of uncer-
tainty in stock sizes are unavoidable. Not only must harvest patterns
change from year to year as stocks vary, but even within a given year,
managers adjust fishing activity interactively. Fisheries are opened and
closed, sometimes from day to day, as more is learned about the
abundance of the stocks.16 This process requires flexibility on the part of
salmon fishers, something that is undoubtedly disliked, yet generally
accepted. In recent years, the system has strayed at times from its
philosophy of careful catch monitoring and adaptive management 7 , but
the overall approach remains an example of "living with uncertainty".
13. Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, B-HQ-90-003E, "Highlights: 1990
Canadian Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan" (2 January 1990).
14. Canada, Independent Review of the State of Northern Cod Stock by L. Harris (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1990).
15. R. Gorham, "Group Seeks Injunction to Quash Cod Quotas" The [Halifax] Chronicle-
Herald (19 January 1990) A3.
16. C.J. Walters, Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources (New York: Macmillan,
1986); L.S. Parsons, supra note 2.
17. Canada, Fraser River Sockeye 1994: Problems and Discrepancies (Ottawa: Canada
Communication Group, 1995) (Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board) (Chair: John A.
Fraser).
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The groundfishery of Atlantic Canada followed a less flexible ap-
proach. While allowable harvest levels (TACs) were typically adjusted
from year to year, there was an implicit attitude that the TAC should be
fixed, firm, and sacrosanct within the fishing season. On paper, allowance
was made for in-season changes to annual catch quotas "as a consequence
of major changes in the scientific advice"18 but the possibility of such
changes was severely restricted. For example, a rule that "no adjustments
will be made to the TAC in cases where the existing TAC is above the
current Fo., value" 9 implied that if DFO had agreed at the start of the
season to an excessive TAC quota (above the F.. target), then no change
in that allowable harvest was allowed within the season.
In reality, within-season changes were very rare indeed; not only were
they inconvenient to management and industry, they were not thought to
be particularly crucial to conservation, given the widespread (although
mistaken) belief that the stocks were almost immune to collapse. It was
felt that any adjustment to the TAC could be left to next year's fishing
plan. Such an attitude allowed the fishing industry to adopt annual
business plans, comparable to those in non-resource sectors.
This in-season rigidity in catch quotas may have improved marketing
and provided some short-term stability, but it also contributed to over-
harvesting and led to considerable dislocation when mid-season changes
did become necessary. A clear example of this arose in August of 1993,
when mounting evidence of the groundfish collapse and concern ex-
pressed by many fishers2", led the Minister to close some fisheries and
reduce quotas in others.
Unfortunately, since allowance for such changes was not well-devel-
oped in the management scheme, considerable difficulties arose in the
quota adjustment process. This was particularly apparent in the indi-
vidual transferable quota (ITQ) system, which had been promoted by
DFO largely through the claim that an ITQ gave each fisher "property
rights", firm shares of the TAC that could be caught anytime desired. In
developing this system, much less attention was focused on the facts
that (a) fish in the sea actually belong to the Canadian public, and
(b) conservation of those fish could demand mid-season reductions in
quotas. Hence, the ITQ scheme was not built around the idea of "living
with uncertainty", and was poorly equipped to assist fishers in equitably
sharing the impacts of mid-season changes.
18. Supra note 12 at 6.
19. Ibid.
20. Canada, We Must Stop Chasing Quotas Down to the Last Fish. 1993 Conservation
Requirements for Atlantic Groundfish: Report to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
(Ottawa: Fisheries Resource Conservation Council, 1993).
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IV. The System Works
When a fishery collapses, the opportunity could be taken to seriously
assess and rectify the root causes, and to radically restructure manage-
ment systems to correct past deficiencies. Alternatively, the focus might
be on business as usual in terms of fishery management, with only minor
tinkering. The choice between these will likely bear on the likelihood of
future fishery collapses.
1. Blaming the Ocean
When the northern cod stock collapsed in the early 1990s, where was
blame placed? In initial DFO press releases, no mention was made of
human impacts on the resource, nor of problems with the quota-setting
system discussed above. Instead, it was stated that "the devastating
decline in the stock of northern cod" was due "primarily to ecotogicat
factors". 1 Undoubtedly, the connection between fish population dynam-
ics and the environment is a complicated one. Yet the study of past fishery
collapses worldwide suggests that while ocean conditions might act as a
"trigger" to initiate a stock collapse, the principal underlying cause of the
collapse is more likely to be high levels of resource exploitation. The
dynamics of collapses are likely highly complex, but the overall sequence
of events may be as follows:
(1) During periods in which ocean and environmental conditions are
"acceptable" (from the perspective of the fish), fundamentally
unsustainable harvest levels may appear to be sustainable.
(2) Inevitably, and quite naturally, ocean conditions will deteriorate at
some point (again from the viewpoint of the fish), so that heavily-
harvested fish populations become subjected to additional stress-
environmental conditions that inhibit growth and reproduction.
(3) Faced with intense over-fishing and a "trigger" in the form of an
adverse environment, the fishery collapses.
This scenario seems to reflect experience around the world, from the
B.C. herring fishery collapse of the 1960s 22 to the Peruvian anchovy
collapse, triggered by ocean cooling known as "El Nino" but due
fundamentally to massive exploitation.2 3
21. Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Press Release, NR-HQ-92-58E, "Crosbie An-
nounces First Steps in Northern Cod (2J3KL) Recovery Program" (2 July 1992).
22. Canada, The Decline and Recovery of Canada's Pacific Herring Stocks (Fisheries and
Marine Technical Report No. 784) by A.S. Hourston (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1978).
23. R. Hilborn & C.J. Walters, Quantitative Fisheries Stock Assessment: Choice, Dynamics
and Uncertainty (New York: Chapman and Hall, 1992).
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In the case of the Atlantic groundfishery collapse, the jury is still out
on impacts of ocean conditions such as temperature, salinity, and ice
cover, as well as effects of predation by seals. However, it is of interest
to review two "retrospective" analyses of the collapse of the northern cod
stock, looking back in time with the benefits of hindsight. Taggart et al.
support the 3-step scenario described above. Their study shows that the
principal culprit for a 50% decline in the quantity of juvenile cod was
"intense fishing" (which reduced the spawning stock as well as the
diversity of fish sizes and ages), and that "poor environmental conditions
have apparently had an additive effect in further limiting recruitment".24
Hutchings and Myers take this further, presenting evidence that fishing
pressure alone is sufficient to explain the collapse of Northern cod; an
appeal to "bad ocean conditions" is simply unnecessary as a part of the
explanation.25 At the very least, the growing evidence suggests that it
would be unwise to place too much blame on the ocean in explaining the
fishery collapse.
2. We Have All Sinned
If the ocean and its inhabitants cannot be blamed for all the fishery's ills,
it becomes necessary to look at human impacts. In this regard, a common
refrain in government and the fishing industry is that "everyone must
share the blame" for the fishery collapse. The implication is that everyone
fished illegally, everyone fished in an anti-conservationist manner, and
everyone contributed to excessive harvests. Is this a fair assessment, or
is the truth more complicated?
Certainly, illegal and nonconservationist fishing practices were wide-
spread-many in the fishing industry now publicly discuss activities they
engaged in or witnessed: dumping, mis-reporting, high-grading, illegal
gear, trans-shipments, excessive effort, processor collusion, and the like.
Yet while such practices were common, there is no evidence that they
were universal. Furthermore, there is a question of "scale"; while some
illegal actions were of a particularly damaging nature, others were no
more than the equivalent of driving a car at 110 kph in a 100 kph zone.
A similar argument applies to overall fishery exploitation; while overall
harvests were excessive, contributions to these harvests were by no
means equal across fishers. Although in the 1980s, many invested
24. C.T. Taggart et al. "Overview of Cod Stocks, Biology, and Environment in the Northwest
Atlantic Region of Newfoundland, with Emphasis on Northern Cod" (1994) 198 ICES Marine
Science Symposium 140.
25. J.A. Hutchings & R.A. Myers, supra note 8.
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massively in large and powerftil vessels, others constrained themselves
to relatively modest investments in new gear and electronics.
It is thus simplistic to claim that "everyone" is to blame; this ignores
massive differences amongst fishers, and fails to recognize the possibility
that some in the industry have behaved ethically throughout. Indeed, the
latter may well have been among those who sounded the unanswered
alarm bells of resource decline as their catches fell in the 1980s.
Why has it become commonplace to extend blame to all in the fishery,
when in fact some are very little to blame while others are more
responsible? Clearly, the spreading of blame distracts attention from the
more serious offenders, but it also benefits the management entities
which failed to control the operation of these offenders. Furthermore,
such an attitude serves to spread the pain of restructuring the fishery. If
the spreading of blame to "everyone" is accepted, then the number of
fishers can be cut "across the board"; there is no need to penalize some
while rewarding those who best lived within their resource means.
Unfortunately, however, it is merely dooming the fishery to future
conservation crises if we fail to understand the real causes of the collapse,
and, in particular, if we place blame in the wrong direction.
3. Too Many People
A related refrain in Atlantic Canada's groundfishery is that the principal
path to sustainable fishing lies in cutting the number of people in the
fishery. The over-capacity issue is often stated simplistically as "too
many people chasing too few fish".
Yet the fishery collapse was not in itself due to an excessive number
of fishers. From the point of view of the fish, the number of people
involved is irrelevant, if catches are kept to a conservationist level. The
key factors are catching power and catching methods, not the number of
people. (This is clear in the lobster fishery, for example, which has been
successful and relatively stable despite the involvement of many thou-
sands of participants.) Indeed, even a powerful fleet does no damage to
the stocks if it is tied to the dock. Problems arise only when fishery
management is unable to control the killing of fish. Hence, the real
problem is the failure of fishery management to predict and control the
fishing effort exerted by a fleet with excess capacity.
An example of a mis-guided focus in dealing with over-capacity are
use-it-or-lose-it policies, through which the government cancels a fisher's
groundfish license if it is not used over a period of time. While the goal
of such policies may be to remove "casual" fishers from the fishery, in fact
they perversely penalize those who respond to a declining resource by
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reducing their impact on the stocks (perhaps by shifting temporarily to
other work), and reward those who place the most pressure on the
resource. The key to a sustainable fishery lies not in these simplistic
efforts to remove people, but rather in careful planning to determine the
number of fishers, the types of fishers, and the means to effectively limit
overall effort in a re-built fishery.
4. Fishing by Numbers
While blame for the groundfish collapse has been placed on "causes"
ranging from the ocean to the number of fishers, little attention has been
paid to inherent problems in the methods used to manage the fishery.
Consider, for example, "quota management", the most fundamental of
groundfish management approaches. Quota management in the Atlantic
groundfishery was based on a number of steps: estimating the weight
(biomass) for each stock, determining an allowable harvest quota (TAC)
as a fraction of that biomass, sub-dividing the TAC by sector (defined by
gear and boat size), and sub-dividing further into individual fisher quotas
in some sectors.
This approach provided, in theory, a firm limit on what can be removed
from the ocean. In practice, however, it has been impossible to properly
determine quota levels, or to fully enforce these quotas given the ease of
cheating.
First, the setting of quotas requires knowledge of the fish biomass,
something that (due to the unfortunate habit fish have of living underwa-
ter) is never known with certainty. The biomass is estimated through two
major sources of assessment information: (1) scientific surveys, using a
research vessel which trawls a net in a systematic manner to estimate fish
abundances, and (2) commercial fishery "catch rates", the rate at which
fish are caught, perhaps measured as catch per tow of a net, or per day of
fishing. Unfortunately, in at least some cases, both of these approaches
produce questionable results. Some scientific surveys are able to cover
only a small fraction of the fishable area (often missing inshore areas) and
are carried out at only limited times of the year. Meanwhile, commercial
fishery data have produced highly misleading results, due to the errone-
ous assumption that "success" in the fishery, as indicated by high catch
rates, is a direct indicator of strong fish stocks. In reality, catch rates
(particularly for trawlers) are connected less to how many fish there are
and more to the use of electronic gear tofind the fish, and to changes in
the pattern of fishing effort. Even as stocks decline, fishers often are able
to find and catch the remaining fish, creating the illusion of a healthy fish
stock.
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Second, quota management creates inherent incentives to harvest
more fish than is allowed in the established quotas. This could be done by
(1) exceeding the quota, whether this be a TAC, an allocated share of the
TAC for a particular sector of the fleet, or an individual quota, (2) "high-
grading" to maximize the value of what is reported as caught, typically
by dumping lesser-valued fish overboard, and/or (3) dumping prohibited
fish (such as that for which the quota has been reached) so as to be able
to continue fishing for other stocks. The first of these problems may be
largely overcome through independent catch monitoring, but the latter
two, taking place at sea, cannot be eliminated (except through the
exorbitantly expensive means of placing observers on every vessel).
Incentives for high-grading and dumping can be expected to increase
as quotas are subdivided to gear sectors and then to individuals. In the
latter case, individual quota or trip limit systems "personalize" the
benefits of such actions, so that each individual will wish to take their full
quota and to ensure it is comprised of the most valuable fish (particularly
when the fisher must pay for the catch quota). While such incentives may
be reduced if quotas are transferable (because in theory, one can buy more
quota from another fisher to account for extra harvests), they are unlikely
to disappear, given the ease of dumping and the economics of quotas. An
incentive for dumping will exist in a number of circumstances, such as (a)
if the market value of small fish in the catch is less than the cost of quota
to account for them, or (b) if the cost of quota for a species of low
abundance rises to high levels, because that quota is needed in order to
keep operating in a mixed-stock fishery, particularly toward the end of the
fishing season.
For example, consider a system of individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) in a fishery for two species, say haddock and cod. Toward the end
of the fishing season, all fishers may have almost exhausted their quotas
for one of the species, say haddock. Then each fisher has an incentive to
dump overboard any haddock caught while fishing for cod. As long as this
continues, the fisher benefits directly in being able to continue fishing for
cod, without violating quota restrictions. On the other hand, under a
global quota, if the same fisher were to dump haddock, the quota thereby
"saved" would be necessarily shared by the entire fleet, and would
therefore keep the fishery open only marginally longer. Thus, dumping
would imply sacrificing a valuable haddock catch, while receiving only
slight benefits. Hence, under such circumstances, the incentive for
dumping under a global (or sector-based) TAC may be less than that
under individual quotas.
Not only are quota controls difficult to calculate and to enforce, the
anti-conservationist behaviour they induce decreases the quality of data
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(and bias that data) in the stock assessment process, thereby tending to
produce faulty assessments of stock status and over-estimates of feasible
catch levels. While quota management does have its strong points, these
various problems suggest that there is at least scope for a critical
assessment of such controls as conservation tools. However, little re-
search has been undertaken on alternatives to this groundfishery status
quo, and indeed, there persists a dominant view in the fishery, with
respect to quota management, that "the system works".
Conclusions
This paper has taken a nonstandard approach to examining the Atlantic
Canadian groundfishery fishery collapse, focusing on the role of human
attitudes, rather than on possible causes that are perhaps more concrete,
such as excessive foreign fishing, predation by seals, cold water, gear
technologies, government management, problems with the science, or
political factors. This is because underlying many of these considerations
lie the attitudes, the philosophical underpinnings, which drive decision
making.26 In particular, this paper has considered four themes:
(1) The role of the regulator. Past attitudes about regulation have
ranged from a free enterprise (laissez-faire) view preferred by
fishers, to a desire by managers for "total control" over the fishers.
Neither perspective seems to promote sustainable fisheries. While
these attitudes may still be found in the fishery, the movement is
toward more effective approaches. However, in the search for
improved management, it will be important to seek greater in-
volvement of the resource owners (the Canadian public) and those
dependent on the fishery (the coastal communities).
(2) The burden of proof. In any fishery, there is a need to balance
risks-the possibility that overly-conservative management will
sacrifice fishery benefits, and the possibility that excessive re-
source use will result in stock collapse. It is a matter of attitude,
indeed of philosophy, as to this desired balance. Where the balance
has favoured exploitation over conservation, adoption of a precau-
tionary approach to management ("erring on the side of conserva-
tion") may require adjustment of this direction.
(3) Conservation can wait. Various groundfish management measures
have acted to postpone or reduce conservation actions, thereby
avoiding the consequent disruption of the fishing industry, both
26. A.T. Charles, "Canadian Fisheries: Paradigms and Policy" in D. VanderZwaag, ed.,
Canadian Ocean Law and Policy (Markham: Butterworths, 1992) 3.
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between and within fishing seasons. Some of these, such as the
"50% rule" and the adoption of quotas above recommended
levels, seem to have disappeared from the fishery. These are
positive steps toward sustainability.
(4) The system works. If we believe that "the system works" with
regard to groundfishery management, then little structural change
is needed in the operation of the fishery. Blame for the collapse can
be deflected onto non-human factors, such as the ocean and its
inhabitants, or spread so widely among fishers that no one takes
particular responsibility. Unfortunately, if in fact major changes
are needed to "the system", and we ignore the fact, this attitude will
destine us to repeat collapses in the future.
Sustainability in fishery systems undoubtedly requires appropriate
attitudes, together with appropriate management.2 7 One crucial facet of
this lies at the "personal" level. It is often said that sustainability will be
possible only when a "conservation ethic" develops amongst fishers. Yet,
while the search for sustainable fisheries will certainly be aided if
individuals behave ethically, staying within the rules set out by society,
more is clearly needed.
As noted at the outset, while attitudes are most often viewed as
something personal, in fact they exist equally strongly at the larger level
of the institution-for example, within government and fishery bodies.
Appropriate attitudes are required not just on the part of the individual
harvesters but throughout the system: in the scientific process, in the
design of management measures, in the structure and operation of the
fishery, and within the decisieon-making bodies. Accordingty, the focus
of this paper has been at this institutional level, examining aspects of the
"accepted wisdom" amongst the fishery's dominant players, both in
government and the industry, on the basis that attitudes at this level most
affected the process of fishery decision making.
The key implication arising from an examination of past fishery
attitudes is the need for change. However, such change must be translated
as well into a change in actions. Even before the groundfish collapse of
the 1990s, some movement in this direction was evident. Now, it is crucial
that major adjustments in attitude and action come into play before the
fishery recovers, conservation is forgotten, and the next collapse gathers
momentum.
27. A.T. Charles, "Towards Sustainability: The Fishery Experience" (1994) 11 Ecological
Economics 201.
